

Building Your Own Bank

or...

Constructing Crypto Castles


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A History Rife with Failure



An estimated 4,000,000+ BTC lost.
An estimated 2,000,000+ BTC stolen.

Issues of Personal Responsibility

- Few folks think about self defense because they aren't big targets
- Few folks have much more protecting them at home than a few walls and doors that are easily breached by a motivated attacker
- No way to reverse theft of bearer assets means more motivated attackers
- If everyone fails at securing their assets, they won't be worth much



Attacks

Physical Theft

Digital Theft

Physical disaster

Social Engineering

Collusion

Defenses

Safes, hidden storage, guards

Offline storage

Redundant storage

Education, Paranoia

Trust Minimization

Key Holding Risks

User holds key

OR

Service holds key

- Malware
- Weak password
- Coercion
- Death of owner
- Data loss
- Forgotten password
- Phishing

- Malware
- Hacks
- Insider theft
- Fractional reserve
- Government seizure
- Data loss
- Frozen by service
- Phishing

Key Holding Risks

User holds key

AND
(2-of-2)

Service holds key

- ~~Malware~~
- ~~Weak password~~
- ~~Coercion~~
- Death of owner
- Data loss
- Forgotten password
- Phishing

- ~~Malware~~
- ~~Hacks~~
- ~~Insider theft~~
- ~~Fractional reserve~~
- Government seizure
- Data loss
- Frozen by service
- Phishing

Key Holding Risks

User holds multiple keys **AND** Service holds key
(2-of-3, 3-of-5...)

- ~~Malware~~
- ~~Weak password~~
- ~~Coercion~~
- ~~Death of owner~~
- ~~Data loss~~
- ~~Forgotten password~~
- **Phishing**

- ~~Malware~~
- ~~Hacks~~
- ~~Insider theft~~
- ~~Fractional reserve~~
- ~~Government seizure~~
- ~~Data loss~~
- ~~Frozen by service~~
- **Phishing**

Security Engineering Objectives

1. Protect users from **trusted third parties**.
2. Protect users from **attackers**.
3. Protect users from **themselves**.

It's preferable for a user to temporarily lose access to their funds than for an attacker to temporarily gain access.

Security Engineering Objectives

1. Protect users from **trusted third parties**.
2. Protect users from **themselves**.
3. Protect users from **attackers**.

If we push security out to the edges of the network, users are more likely to experience loss due to negligence rather than attack.

How to Build a Bitcoin Bank

Step 1: Write down this 24 word seed phrase and keep it safe.




How to Build a Bitcoin Bank

Step 1: Write down this 24 word seed phrase and keep it safe.



Users Shouldn't Handle Seeds



Seedless



Recovery

Paper Wallets are Prone to Failure

- Hard to generate private keys securely
- Loss to **physical attackers** if unencrypted
- Loss due to **environmental factors**
- Loss due to **improper transaction construction** / single key sweeping



Metal Wallets are Prone to Failure

- Loss to **physical attackers** if unencrypted
- Loss due to **environmental factors**
- Loss due to **improper transaction construction** / single key sweeping



Add Redundancy: Eliminate SPoF

Multi-signature

Multi-device

Multi-location



My Personal (pre-Casa) Solution

1. Create encrypted file container on airgapped machine with VeraCrypt
2. Encrypt container with a randomly generated long passphrase that you generate via rolling dice
3. Use ssss to split the decryption passphrase into your preferred setup. This mainly depends upon how many trusted friends and family you're willing to store the encrypted data and decryption shards with. You also want enough redundancy that your M of N scheme doesn't become useless if a member or two loses their data or dies / is no longer able to participate in a recovery ceremony.
4. Copy file onto N USB drives and place one ssss shard on each drive
5. Hand out USB drives in faraday bags to will executors.
6. Update annually to protect against bitrot.
7. Write down what you have done and provide detailed step-by-step instructions for how to recover the data if you're no longer around.
8. **MAKE SURE YOU TEST YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.**

Complexity is the Enemy of Security

We aren't just engineering financial applications for motivated, enthusiastic users. We're also engineering them for the less savvy heirs who may have to execute a recovery.



How to Build a Bitcoin Bank / Crypto Castle

Use the basic building blocks:

- Air gaps are the moat
- Strong crypto / multisig are the stone walls
- Hardware key managers are the portcullis
- Wallet software is the gatehouse
- Automated alerts are the watchtowers
- A simple duress kill switch is the drawbridge



Trust Minimization



Low Trust
Low Convenience

High Trust
High Convenience


Push security to the edges

Simple full node integration is preferable



Trust me


I'm an engineer




User Friendliness

Software should bake in best practices to educate & guide the user.

Visual representations of security make it more real.



Ignorance Protection



Some users will get tricked or otherwise compromised. It's hard to stop social engineering.

Solutions:

Remind user to verify address out of band with counterparty.

OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY

Malware blacklists

Reputation features & covenants




Begin Building Your Crypto Castle Today!



Questions?

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