

Dandelion: Privacy-Preserving Transaction Propagation in Bitcoin's P2P Network


Presenter: Giulia Fanti

Joint work with: Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrisnan, Surya Bakshi, Brad Denby, Shruti Bhargava, Andrew Miller, Pramod Viswanath



Bitcoin P2P Primer

Blockchain
sd93fjj2
pckrn29
...
tx




Privacy requirement:

Address and real identity must be unlinkable

Bitcoin Address  IP Address

Today, messages spread with **diffusion**.



Diffusion is vulnerable to source detection!


Biryukov et al. CCS 2014
Koshy *et al.*, Financial Crypto 2014
F. and Viswanath, NIPS 2017

Dandelion


Lightweight transaction propagation algorithm with
provable privacy guarantees.

FAQ: Why not alternative solutions?

Connect through Tor




I2P Integration (e.g. Monero)




Model


Assumptions and Notation



Adversarial model




Metric for Anonymity



Goal:


Design a distributed flooding protocol that minimizes the maximum **precision** and **recall** achievable by a computationally-unbounded adversary.

Fundamental Limits




What are we looking for?

Asymmetry




Mixing




What can we control?

Spreading Protocol




Given a graph, how do we spread content?

Topology




What is the underlying graph topology?

Dynamicity



How often does the graph change?

Spreading Protocol: Dandelion



Why Dandelion spreading?

Theorem: Dandelion spreading has an **optimally low** maximum recall of $p + O\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$.

lower bound = p




fraction
of spies



number of
nodes




Graph Topology: Line




Dynamicity: High

Change the anonymity graph frequently.




DANDELION Network Policy

Spreading Protocol




Given a graph, how do we spread content?

Topology



What is the anonymity graph topology?

Dynamicity



How often does the graph change?

lower bound = p^2



Theorem: DANDELION has a **nearly-optimal** maximum precision of $\frac{2p^2}{1-p} \log \binom{2}{p} + o\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)^*$




fraction
of spies



number of
nodes

*For $p < \frac{1}{3}$


Performance: Achievable Region



Why does DANDELION work?


Strong mixing properties.

Tree



Precision: $O(p)$


Complete graph
(Crowds, Tor)




Precision: $\frac{p}{1-p} (1 - e^{p-1})$

Graph construction in practice

Choose $d=1$
outbound edges




Gives approximate d-regular anonymity graph



What are drawbacks of Dandelion?

Attack	Effect on Dandelion	Proposed Solution	Effect
Graph Learning	Precision increases to $O(p)$	4-regular anonymity graph	Limits precision gain (Thm. 1)
Intersection	Empirical precision increase	Pseudorandom forwarding	Improved robustness (Thm. 2)
Graph construction	Empirical precision increase	Non-interactive construction	Reduced precision gain
Black hole	Transactions do not propagate	Random stem timers	Provides robustness (Prop. 3)
Partial deployment	Arbitrary recall increase	Blind stem selection	Reduces recall (Thm. 3)

Experiments on mainnet




Take-Home Messages

- 1) Bitcoin's P2P network has weak anonymity protections
- 2) DANDELION may be a lightweight solution against large-scale deanonymization attacks (but doesn't replace Tor!)
- 3) More information at:


<https://github.com/dandelion-org/bips>
<https://github.com/dandelion-org/bitcoin>

Simulation on Bitcoin P2P Topology



4-Regular Graphs

- More robust against adversaries that learn the graph
- Per-transaction routing vulnerable to intersection attacks



One-to-one
Routing


- **Pro:** Increases cost of graph-learning attacks
- **Con:** Can make transactions from the same source easier to link

FAQ: Why not Tor?


- Tor, VPNs, etc. address this problem
- Only work for savvy or privacy-aware users
- If Bitcoin is to become a mainstream payment system, it should protect **everyone's** transactions
- Dandelion: lightweight, easy to integrate into existing network





Moving from theory to practice



Implementation: Dandelion spreading



Anonymity graph construction



Adversarial Model: Byzantine nodes

Learn the
graph


Misbehave during
graph construction

Misbehave during
propagation




4-regular
graphs


Anonymity graph construction




Dealing with stronger adversaries




Partial deployment




Latency Overhead: Estimate




Propagation Delay by Network Adoption




DANDELION vs. Tor, Crowds, etc.




- 1) Messages propagate over the **same** cycle graph
- 2) Anonymity graph changes dynamically.
- 3) No encryption required.








Anonymity graph construction



Base Case




**k=1 rounds of
Degree-Checking**



Degree

Dealing with stronger adversaries





Learning the anonymity graph

Precision

Line

Random regular



Graph unknown


$$O\left(p^2 \log\left(\frac{1}{p}\right)\right)$$

Graph known

$$\Omega(p)$$


?

Manipulating the anonymity graph




DANDELION++ Network Policy

Spreading Protocol




Given a graph, how do we spread content?

Topology



What is the anonymity graph topology?

Dynamicity



How often does the graph change?