Blind Signatures in Scriptless Scripts

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Schnorr Signatures

G is generator of a DLog hard group

```
def keygen():
  x := rand, P := x*G
  return (x. P)
def sign(x, m):
  k := rand, R := k*G
  s := k + hash(R,P,m)*x
return (R. s)
def verify(P, m, R, s):
  return s*G ?= R + hash(R,P,m)*P
```

Blind Signatures

- Blind signer does not know the message being signed
- ▶ Blind signature gets *unblinded*, s.t. unblinded and blind sig are not linkable
- 2 party protocol between Client and Server
 - 1. Client knows message, Server does not
 - 2. Client creates blind challenge
 - 3. Server signs blind challenge and gives to Client
 - 4. Client unblinds signature

Blind Schnorr Signatures

```
def server nonce():
  k := rand, R := k*G
  return (k, R)
def client blind(R. m):
  alpha := rand, beta := rand
  R' := R + alpha*G + beta*P
  c' := hash(R', P, m), c := c'+beta
  return (alpha, beta, R', c', c)
```

Blind Signatures

Blind Schnorr Signatures

```
def server_sign (k, x, c):
  s := k + c * x
  return s
def client_unblind(alpha, s):
  s' := s + alpha
  return s'
def verify(P, m, R', s'):
  return s'*G ?= R' + hash(R',P,m)*P
```

Ecash

- Trusted server maintains a database to prevent double spending
- Server database consists of serial numbers that have been spent
- Ecash token is tuple
 - (serial number, server sig(serial number))

res **Ecash** Fair Exchange Blind Coinswaps Tokens Conclusion

Ecash

Reissuance protocol to exchange token for fresh unlinkable token:

- Client chooses new random serial number and blind challenge
- Client shows token and blind challenge to Server
- 3. Server aborts if token serial number is in DB
- 4. Server signs blind challenge and inserts serial number in database
- 5. Client unblinds signature to get fresh token (reissuance proocol is also used for payments)

Exchange Discrete Logs for Bitcoin

Buyer wants to buy discrete log of point T = t*G from Seller

- 1. Buyer creates multisig output with Seller
- 2. Seller sends transaction and *adaptor signature* with T to Buyer
- 3. Buyer gives Seller her signature over the transaction
- 4. Seller spends the output
- Buyer computes the discrete log t from Seller's tx signature and adaptor signature

Blockchain footprint: single boring transaction

Exchange Discrete Logs for LN Payments

Requires Lightning with *Multi-Hop Locks* in place of HTLCs.

- HTLCs
 - 1. Buyer $\xrightarrow{\text{hash(p)}}$ Hop $\xrightarrow{\text{hash(p)}}$ Seller
 - 2. Seller claims with preimage p

Exchange Discrete Logs for LN Payments

Multi-Hop Locks use curve points instead of hashes

- 1. Buyer $\xrightarrow{L1}$ Hop $\xrightarrow{L2}$ Seller
 - Buyer set up route to buy discrete log of T = t*G
 - ▶ L1 = T + 11*G
 - I.2 = I.1 + 12*G
- 2. Buyer gives 12 to Hop and 11 + 12 to Seller
- 3. Seller claims L2 with c2 = (t + 11 + 12)
- 4. Hop claims L1 with c1 = c2 12
- 5. Buyer computes t = c1 11

Exchange Blind Signatures for Bitcoin

Building block: Committed R-point signatures

- 1. Seller creates public nonce R
- 2. Buyer can compute Seller's signature s times G (without being able to compute s of course) as R + hash(R,P,m)*P = s*G


Exchange Blind Signatures for Bitcoin

- Committed R-point signatures work for blind signatures too! So Client computes Server's blind signature s times G
- ► Then buys discrete log of s*G with bitcoins using above techniques

Blind Coinswaps

- Coinswap where Server can not link coins
 - similar to Tumblebit
 - but with scriptless scripts
- Key idea: Client buys blind signature from Server where the message is a transaction that gives Server's coins to the Client

Blind Coinswaps



- 1. Create blind challenge from unsigned tx
- 2. Create blind sig times G
- 3. Pay for its DLog (the actual blind sig)
- 4. Unblind and broadcast tx

Exchanging Ecash Tokens for Bitcoin

- Want Clients buy tokens from each other without trust
- Server needs to make sure that buyer gets token and seller bitcoins
 - 1. Payment uses multisig with Server
 - 2. Or Server is part of lightning payment route
 - 3. Or issue token with locktime

Brands credentials

- think ecash tokens that encode more attributes
- essentially Pedersen multicommitments of the attributes
 - \rightarrow a1*G1 + a2*G2 + + r*G
- allows proving properties of token attributes in zero knowledge

Brands credentials

Reissuance of example ecash token (type, amount, serial number, server signature)

- 1. Client chooses new random serial number and blind challenge
- Client shows token and blind challenge to Server
- 3. Client proves that type and amount in token and in challenge is the same
- 4. [...]

Exchanging Ecash Tokens for Bitcoin

- Token seller runs version of reissuance protocol with Server and receives two tokens with the same serial number
- Buyer token
 (BUYERSECRET, SELLERSECRET,
 type_buyer, amount, serial number,
 server signature)
 - reissued only when providing BUYERSECRET, SELLERSECRET
- Seller token (LOCKTIME, type_seller, amount, serial number, server signature)
 - reissued only when LOCKTIME is over

Exchanging Ecash Tokens for Bitcoin

- 1. Seller gives buyer token without SELLERSECRET to buyer and proves that LOCKTIME of seller token is sufficiently far in the future
- 2. Buyer buys SELLERSECRET from seller either on-chain or off-chain using above techniques
- EITHER Buyer runs reissuance protocol with Server
 OR Buyer becomes unresponsive and Seller runs reissuance protocol after LOCKTIME

Conclusion

- Blind signatures are useful in Bitcoin protocol designs (blind coinswaps)
- Can build trustless off-chain or on-chain ecash token exchange protocols using scriptless scripts
- Next steps
 - Schnorr soft fork
 - Lightning v1.x

Further Reading

- Schnorr, C.. Security of Blind Discrete Log Signatures Against Interactive Attacks
- Scriptless Scripts
- Scriptless Scripts in Lightning
- Malavolta, G., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Schneidewind, C., Kate, A., & Maffei, M. Multi-Hop Locks for Secure, Privacy-Preserving and Interoperable Payment-Channel Networks.
- Blind Coinswaps
- Brands, S. (2002). A technical overview of digital credentials.

Q&A

- ► Slides: https://nickler.ninja/slides/2018-bob.pdf
- Questions?